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In the absence of a statutory instrument to enforce payment of a regulatory fee, regulators are 
reliant on a combination of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to encourage financial contribution by the 
bodies they oversee. In contrast to extant studies of public funding of nonprofits, we 
empirically evaluate the effectiveness of a government policy to rely on nonprofit funding of 
statutory regulation. We exploit a sharp discontinuity in the eligibility threshold for charities 
contributing to a new Fundraising Regulator in England & Wales in order to estimate a causal 
effect of the levy on participation. We show that the regulator’s threat to ‘name and shame’ 
was very effective in incentivizing regulatory participation and generating income, but raise 
some concerns about the long-term viability of this approach. The results are significant at a 
time when many jurisdictions are considering how best to fund the regulation of nonprofits. 




Evidence for Practice 
 Fundraising charities place high value on their reputations, and the threat of being 
‘named and shamed’ by the Fundraising Regulator for not paying the fundraising levy 
was one that charities took seriously. 
 The way that the Fundraising Regulator implemented the levy, by sending invoices to 
eligible charities playing down the ‘voluntary’ nature of the levy, was necessary to get 
charities to join. This was especially the case for medium-sized organizations. 
 Cost was not a significant barrier to membership of the Fundraising Regulator for 
most charities, and so charities do not seem to be very sensitive to the price for 
joining. However, this also means that altering the levy fee bands may not result in 
significantly higher or lower numbers of paying organizations. 
 The estimated income for the Fundraising Regulator attributable to the ‘name and 
shame’ approach was significant (approximately £900,000 per annum), and without 
this it is likely that the level of resources available for fundraising regulation, 





An important role for regulators across the world is to increase the trust of consumers and/or 
the public in the sector which is being regulated (Keating & Thrandardottir 2017). In many 
sectors, the violation of regulations by the few can have a negative externality, affecting trust 
even in other organizations that conform to the regulation (Kilpatrick & Lapsley 1996). But 
regulators can also take actions which may undermine broader trust in their sector, 
particularly when they highlight bad practice. This is a tension in accountability: good 
transparency can incentivize compliance with regulatory requirements, but it also risks 
undermining trust in a sector if it shows violations to be widespread. 
A thorny issue in the establishment of many regulators is the question of how they are to be 
funded. Regulators who are dependent on registration fees from the organizations they 
regulate may use a combination of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ if they are to gain sufficient 
participation; both to achieve legitimacy as well as to be financially viable. 
The carrots are often fairly clear: a potential gain in reputation from demonstrating 
conformity to the regulatory requirements, perhaps by being listed in a register with an 
accompanying a mark of approval (May 2005). In terms of sticks, traditionally regulators 
would adopt a “command and control” approach to compel participation: for example, in the 
field of environmental governance regulators would command firms to reduce emissions and 
control how they did it e.g. by specifying technologies (Prakash and Potoski 2011). In the 
absence of statutory powers, regulators often rely on information-based approaches such as 
implementing voluntary disclosure regimes and threatening further statutory regulation if 
there is non-compliance (Busuioc and Lodge 2017; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Another 
option is for the regulator to actively ‘name and shame’ organizations who do not or only 
partially participate in regulation. This imposes a potential reputational cost on the non-
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complying organization when their actions are publicly highlighted. It also creates a risk of 
damaging the wider reputation of the sector being regulated and delegitimizing the mandate 
of the regulator, particularly if significant numbers of organizations do not comply. 
The United Kingdom charity sector has come under increasing scrutiny in recent times, as 
evidenced by the commission of parliamentary inquiries into regulation (2013), fundraising 
(2015), and the general health of sector (2017). The nature and legitimacy of fundraising 
regulation has been particularly high on the agenda given the 2016 transition from self-
regulation to statutory regulation in England & Wales. Not only are registered charities 
subject to oversight by the new regulatory body, the Fundraising Regulator, those who meet 
certain criteria are also expected to pay a voluntary levy to help fund the Regulator’s 
activities. The voluntary nature of this levy is questionable, as the Regulator has threatened to 
publically name organizations that it deems should pay the requisite fee but who do not. 
In this article we empirically examine the impact of the levy on the charity sector in England 
& Wales, in particular the implications of the Regulator’s ‘name and shame’ approach to 
incentivizing participation in the levy scheme. Contributing to both the fundraising regulation 
and broader public regulation literatures, we address three research questions: 
1. Was the reputational risk of ‘naming and shaming’ an effective incentive for charities 
to pay the levy for fundraising regulation? 
2. How big an impact did this incentive have on levy payments by different sized 
charities and on the ability of the regulator to raise funds?  
3. What can regulators learn about the effectiveness of ‘naming and shaming’ as a 
means of regulatory compliance? 
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We show that ‘naming and shaming’ was effective in encouraging compliance with the levy, 
that price was not a binding constraint, and that the policy was critical to the financial 
sustainability of the regulator. However, we reflect on the longer term impact on the 
relationship between the regulator and the organizations being regulated that this policy may 
have. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we synthesize the nonprofit and fundraising regulation 
literatures to produce a conceptual understanding of how charities respond to and are affected 
by regulatory initiatives and incentives. This is followed by an outline of fundraising 
regulation in England & Wales, and the new regulator’s attempts to levy a fee on charities to 
fund its operations. We describe the data and methods, before presenting our empirical 
results. The article concludes with a discussion of the scholarly, policy and practitioner 
implications of the study. 
Theory 
Regulation is a multi-dimensional concept, and has been understood as a specific set of 
commands, as deliberative state influence, and as all forms of social or economic interest 
(Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2011). Despite its obvious negative connotations as an activity 
that can restrict and control behavior, regulation can also play a facilitative or enabling role in 
a sector (Baldwin et al. 2011). Trust is a salient component in the formation, behavior and 
impact of regulatory regimes. Johnson, Jenkinson, Kendall and Bradshaw (1998, 310) argue 
that “All regulatory systems are to some extent dependent on trust. Evaluation, monitoring 
and inspection are time-consuming and costly and complete policing is undesirable.” Trust is 
also a crucial component in the funding of regulators: stakeholders making a financial 
contribution to the regulator’s budget must trust their contributions will be used effectively, 
efficiently and in way that benefits them and the wider sector, whilst those overseeing the 
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regulator’s activities need to have faith that said contributions do not lead to regulatory 
capture. 
There is a consensus emerging that the success of the charity sector depends not only on its 
economic and social activities but also on its ability to demonstrate accountability and 
transparency, which in turn can develop, protect and enhance public trust (Breen 2009; 
Connolly and Hyndman 2013; Cordery and Morgan 2013; Cordery et al. 2017; Keating and 
Frumkin, 2003; Morgan 2012). Bovens (2007, 452) defines accountability as “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum in which the actor is obliged to explain and justify his conduct; 
the forum can pose questions; pass judgment; and the actor may face consequences.” At its 
core, accountability is about trust, and consists of four components: transparency, making 
information accessible and assessable for scrutiny; compliance, adhering to standards and 
requirements; justification, explaining the reasoning behind actions (including those not 
adopted); and enforcement or sanctions, administered by those with monitoring powers 
(Ebrahim 2010).  
In order to trust charities – either individually or the sector as a whole – the public must 
perceive these organizations to be performing effectively. Perception here is key, with a 
number of studies reporting that the public perceiving charities to be well organized, efficient 
and effective was fundamental to building trust (Furneaux and Wymer 2015; Kennedy et al. 
2001; McFall 1987; Michel and Rieunier 2012; Sargeant and Lee 2004; Sargeant et al. 2001, 
2004). Where possible, people may base their perceptions on personal experience of the 
charity (Furneaux and Wymer 2015). Where personal experiences are limited, potential 
donors may instead uses proxies as the basis of their trust and therefore their decision making 
(Sargeant et al. 2008). One commonly used proxy is the status of an organization, with 
membership of a regulated group communicating trustworthiness (Sargeant et al. 2008). 
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There is some evidence from previous studies that increased public trust in charities – partly 
as a result of their regulated status – leads to increased levels of donations, although such 
findings are generally based on stated rather than actual donor behavior (e.g. Bourassa and 
Stang 2016; Sargeant et al. 2004) or on public goods games (e.g. Jackson and Matthews 
1995; Parsons 2003; 2007). Often this trust, however, is more related to perceptions of the 
sector as a whole than to any individual charities (Sargeant et al. 2004; Tonkiss and Passey 
1999). Therefore, good governance, transparency and accountability are necessary in order to 
seek to ensure this trust, although as O’Neill (2009, 243) argues, “the relationship between 
trust and behavior is complex”. While we have identified above the potential positive impacts 
of the use of regulation to encourage and enhance accountability in terms of increased donor 
trust and (possibly) increased donations as a consequence, regulation of the charity sector is 
not without consequences, intended or otherwise (Irvin 2005). Corry (2010) argues forcefully 
that charities cannot be regulated without imposing some organizational and sectoral cost, 
mainly as a result of dampening the essential qualities of these organizations (e.g. voluntary 
participation, autonomy). Hyndman and McDonnell (2009; see also Cordery 2013) contend 
that charities may become more accountable to the regulator at the expense of their donors 
and beneficiaries, while burdensome reporting requirements can incentivize the reallocation 
of resources to satisfy regulatory demands (Szper and Prakash 2011). The use of coercive 
approaches to incentive compliance may also politicize and damage the relationship between 
the regulator and charities (Phillips, 2013). Finally, regulation can be an expensive way of 
increasing public trust, with Bekkers (2003) finding no clear link between increased 
regulation and increased trust in charities. Similarly, McDonnell (2017), in a longitudinal 
study of Scottish charities, found no link between the presence of regulator-defined 
accountability concerns (e.g. possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes) and 
negative organizational outcomes such as dissolution or misconduct. 
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The agency of charities is also critical to consider when examining the use of regulation to 
encourage and develop public trust in the sector. Beyond the formal regulation imposed on 
charities by England & Wales’ Charity Commission (see Hogg 2018; Phillips and Smith 
2011), the sector possesses the following instruments for demonstrating trustworthiness: 
subscribing to voluntary codes, achieving certification, adhering to standards and 
benchmarks, voluntary disclosure of information requested by stakeholders, and engaging in 
training to improve practice (Phillips 2013). Charities have a strong incentive to go above-
and-beyond what is required of them by statutory regulation and employ one or more of the 
aforementioned instruments. If, as Sargeant et al. (2004) argue, public trust is based on 
perceptions of the charity sector as a whole, then the sector can suffer from a contamination 
problem, where the actual or perceived misconduct of a minority of organizations can tarnish 
the reputations of legitimate, ethical charities (Burger and Owens 2010; Ortmann and 
Schlesinger 1997). The contamination problem is partly attributed to the information 
asymmetries regarding charity behavior that develop between the public and the 
organizations themselves (Tremblay-Boire, Prakash and Gugerty 2016). Thus, legitimate 
charities are incentivized to differentiate themselves from less credible organizations in order 
to preserve trust in their operations. 
Subscribing to a code of practice and engaging in voluntary regulatory programs in general 
represent efforts by charities “to collectively signal their commitment to deploy resources as 
per their organizational mandate.” (Prakash and Gugerty 2010, 3). Participation in such 
programs is based on the assumption that charities value their reputations and public trust in 
the sector as a whole (Phillips 2013). A number of studies have cited ‘brand’ as being 
important to charities (e.g. Michel and Rueunier 2012; Sargeant et al. 2008), and the threat of 
naming and shaming is a clear risk to positive brand reputation for charities. Thus, charities 
that pay the Fundraising Regulator’s voluntary levy can be conceptualized as seeking to 
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signal to the public their commitment to efficient and effective practice i.e. engaging in 
ethical, compliant fundraising practices and using the funds generated as per their mission 
and charitable purposes (Bies 2010; Hogg 2018). 
The Fundraising Regulator is the first attempt in the UK to impose statutory fundraising 
regulation on charities, but it follows in a long history of charity regulation in the UK and 
beyond (see Cordery 2013; Cordery, Sim, and Zijl 2017). The majority of these schemes (e.g. 
Australia, Canada and, England & Wales) do not charge charities to be regulated, although in 
other countries (e.g. New Zealand) there is a small cost (Cordery 2013; Hogg 2018). The 
Fundraising Regulator’s model of voluntary funding of statutory regulation is, however, 
relatively novel. At a time when many countries are having conversations about how best to 
fund the regulation of charitable activities (Bies 2010; Cordery 2013; Cordery, Sim, and Zijl 
2017; Hogg 2018), the lessons from the Fundraising Regulator therefore can inform 
conversations about how best to fund the regulation of charities in countries around the 
world. 
Fundraising Regulation in England & Wales 
U.K. charities are primarily subject to statutory regulation by the Charity Commission for 
England & Wales (CCEW). CCEW is the independent (i.e. non-ministerial department) 
registrar and regulator of charities operating in England & Wales; Scottish and Northern Irish 
charities are subject to their own respective independent regulators. This system is similar to 
those in Australia and the Republic of Ireland, and in contrast to North America, where 
nonprofits are regulated at the federal level by the relevant tax authority. Dunn (2017, 44) 
characterizes the state of charity regulation in England & Wales as an evolving series of 
interactions between state, self and co-regulatory approaches, and is currently moving 
“toward co-regulation against the bedrock of a well-established state regime”. 
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Attempts to regulate fundraising in England & Wales are far from new. The Accrediting 
Bureau for Fundraising Organizations was founded in 1996 in response to concerns about 
mass fundraising and what the media reported at the time as, “financial scandals and an 
alarming drop in public confidence” (Blackhurst 1996, 7, in Bies 2010, 1074). The ABFO 
struggled to gain support, with little buy-in from charities, and by the early 2000s it had 
become clear that the approach of encouraging charities to become accredited was not 
working (Bies 2010; Ortmann et al. 2005). A period of consultation took place to discuss 
what more could be done, which culminated in 2006 with the establishment of self-regulation 
through the Fundraising Standards Board (Bies 2010; Breen 2012; Hind 2017; Sargeant et al. 
2012). The FRSB ruled on alleged breaches of fundraising practice against industry 
standards, with member organizations required to include its ‘blue tick’ logo on their 
fundraising materials (Bies 2010; Hind 2017). It was initially funded by a 5-year government 
grant, alongside a sliding scale of membership fees ranging from £30 per year for the smallest 
charities to £5,000 for the largest (Bies 2010). By 2012, the FRSB had 1,258 member 
charities, around 5% of the estimated 24,000 fundraising charities in the UK and representing 
around 40% of total fundraised income (Breen 2012; Home Office 2005).  
Following a number of fundraising scandals, a review led by Sir Stuart Etherington, Chief 
Executive of the National Council for Voluntary Organizations was established in the 
summer of 2015. The Review recommended that a single regulator be established to combine 
setting standards for good fundraising practice. This regulator was expected to work closely 
with existing regulatory bodies, including the Charity Commission for England & Wales and 
the Information Commissioner’s Office. As a result, the Fundraising Regulator for England & 
Wales was established as an independent body in January 2016 (Hind 2017), with the FRSB 
handing over its powers to investigate and sanction charities to this new body. The new 
Fundraising Regulator has a budget five times greater than the FRSB had in its final years, 
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with a significant proportion of this funding generated through a ‘voluntary’ levy charged on 
large fundraising charities. The details of this levy were outlined in a discussion paper 
produced by the new regulator in the summer of 2016 to which comments and responses 
were invited. As a result, the levy was established with eligible charities expected to 
contribute by paying the ‘voluntary’ levy from September 2016. Asking charities to 
contribute financially towards the costs of regulation was not without controversy, and both 
the principle and the coverage are matters of live policy debate. As the recent Lords Select 
Committee on Charities report noted (2017 Paragraph 276): 
We are conscious of the concerns from the sector that the voluntary levy to fund the 
Regulator may be disproportionately burdensome for small and medium-sized 
charities. We recommend that the new Fundraising Regulator continually monitors 
the impact of the levy, particularly on small- and medium-sized charities, and makes 
changes if appropriate. 
The levy is charged to all charities who spend more than £100,000 per year on fundraising. 
This was assessed based on accounts submitted to the Charity Commission with a financial 
year ending in 2014, the most recent full year of data available in summer 2016. Charities 
falling into this category were asked (and indeed expected) to contribute on a sliding scale 
(shown in Figure 1). In addition, there are a number of ‘exempt charities’ that are not 
regulated by the Charity Commission whose accounting and reporting practices are different 
from regulated charities1. These organizations were levied at a flat rate of £1,000 per annum 
as calculating fundraising expenditure in a standardized way would not be straightforward. 
                                                          
1 Organizations that are exempted from the Charity Commission’s jurisdiction include further and higher 
education institutions, certain museums and art galleries, social housing providers and religious investment 




[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 also shows the percentage of fundraising spend that the annual levy payment 
represents. While this is small for all charities (<0.4%), it peaks for charities spending 
£200,000 on fundraising annually. These differences suggest that charities around this size 
have the potential to be sensitive to the price set by the regulator. 
Invoices requesting payment were issued to eligible ‘levy payers’. The levy payment is 
voluntary, but expected, with the Regulator proposing six reasons why charities should pay 
(Fundraising Regulator 2017): 
 By paying, charities pay their share of the cost of regulation; 
 Paying entitles charities to take part in the setting of fundraising standards, while 
charities who refuse to pay will not be able to take part in these exercises; 
 Paid-up charities can use the Regulator’s “Registered With” logo; 
 Charities who pay will find it easier to meet Charity Commission regulation regarding 
their fundraising activities; 
 Charities who pay are helping to improve donor confidence in fundraising across the 
sector; 
 Charities who are not contributing, “aren’t acting as good corporate citizens”. 
                                                          
expenditure. See the Charity Commission’s detailed guidance on these statuses: Exempt charities (CC23); and 
Excepted charities (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/excepted-charities). 
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Perhaps due to recognition that these reasons alone may not encourage charities to pay the 
levy, significant pressure was put on eligible organizations to contribute to the costs of this 
new regulator through comments by key figures, including then Chair of the Fundraising 
Regulator Lord Grade, at events and in the media. In these comments it was made clear that a 
list of eligible charities who did not pay the levy would be published, in effect to be named 
and shamed. A number of organizations made objections to the arrangements and in 
particular the pressure to pay the levy for an unproven regulator, and not all eligible charities 
contributed. 
Further to this scheme, there was also the opportunity for charities more broadly (those 
spending less than £100k per year on fundraising) to sign-up to the new regulator to 
demonstrate their commitment to the Code of Fundraising Practice. Registration for these 
organizations cost £50 per year, and allowed organizations to use the branding of the 
Fundraising Regulator, to be listed in the Public Register and to benefit from the other 
positive outcomes outlined above. 
In August 2017, at the end of the first year of the levy payment scheme, the Fundraising 
Regulator named the charities who had paid the levy, and those who had refused or not 
communicated with the regulator. This revealed high participation rates, particularly amongst 
larger charities, but still significant numbers of organizations who had opted out. 
The gradient in participation rates by fundraising spend illustrates the increasing potential 
benefit of registration to charities with a bigger stake in high-profile fundraising. It also hints 
at the potential reputational damage for charities who were named as non-payers, particularly 
if they were well known. But given that many organizations did opt-in to the previous self-





In estimating the effect that the Fundraising Regulator’s imposition of the ‘fundraising levy’ 
had on the willingness of charities to take up membership of the regulatory body we cannot 
simply compare charities who do join with those who do not. While we can observe many 
aspects of a charities finances from their annual returns to the Charity Commission, we would 
be concerned that unobserved heterogeneity between charities would be a confounding factor 
in their decision to participate. That is, some charities would derive more benefit from 
participation than others, in a way which we do not directly observe, leading our estimate of 
the effectiveness of the levy to be biased. In the absence of a randomized control trial to 
estimate this effect, we exploit a natural experiment that arises unintentionally from the 
design of the levy enforcement in order to make a causal estimate of the levy’s effect. 
Regression Discontinuity Design 
We use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to estimate the effect of the threshold set 
by the Fundraising Regulator on participation in the voluntary levy scheme. RDD is a method 
for estimating treatment effects “in a non-experimental setting where treatment is determined 
by whether an observed “assignment” variable (also referred to in the literature as the 
“forcing” variable or the “running” variable) exceeds a known cut-off point” (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010, 281). Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) were the first to apply this 
technique in their analysis of the impact of merit awards on future academic performance, 
and RDD is now applied frequently in policy analysis studies across economics, education, 
public administration and social policy. The idea behind the RDD approach is that 
observations just above and below the cut-off point (threshold) are similar and thus good 
comparisons. RDD is suitable for estimating causal effects when units cannot precisely 
manipulate the assignment variable, variation near the threshold is randomized as a result of 
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the first assumption, and therefore RDD can be analyzed and tested like a randomized 
experiment (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
Given these assumptions, we exploit the sharp eligibility threshold by fundraising 
expenditure in order to make a causal estimate of the effect of the fundraising levy, 
particularly amongst smaller fundraising charities. This exploits the randomization into levy 
eligibility that results for charities with fundraising expenditure close to the threshold. As we 
are trying to estimate a causal effect of treatment, and charities are effectively randomized 
into treatment (above the threshold) and control (below the threshold) groups we do not 
control for other covariates as might be done if one were trying to explicitly model the 
predictors of membership. 
Our model is a linear probability model of membership of the regulatory scheme (Yi) as a 
function of fundraising expenditure (Xi) and a treatment dummy (Di) that equals one above 
the levy threshold at c: 
  (1) 
The estimate of interest is the treatment effect τ at the cutoff, given participation Yi with 
fundraising expenditure of Xi, and a threshold in levy eligibility at c = £100,000. 
     (2) 
We estimate the RDD models in Stata 15 using the -rdrobust- package (Calonico et al. 2017). 
This effect is estimated using local polynomial methods with bandwidth h around the cutoff 
c, such that: 
       (3) 
 
 18 
The bandwidth h, is estimated optimally following (Calonico et al. 2017) and we use a local 
linear point estimator with a triangular kernel that assigns linear down-weighting to 
observations further from the cut-off. 
As recommended, a range of polynomial specifications were estimated of order zero, one and 
two. The model was also estimated over a local sample (fundraising spend restricted to +/- 
£100k around the threshold) and the whole sample. In addition, a number of further 
robustness checks examining polynomial specification, kernel and bandwidth selection were 
estimated, and these are reported in the online supplementary document accompanying this 
article. 
The regression discontinuity is estimated close to the threshold, and so is most applicable for 
organizations that are close to the threshold. However, the RD estimate is in fact a weighted 
average treatment effect, where the weights are the relative probabilities that organizations 
are close to the threshold (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
Data 
The financial data on registered charities in England & Wales was drawn from the Charity 
Commission’s data extract, which is freely available online (Charity Commission 2017). 
Specifically, detailed historical financial information by financial year is contained within the 
Annual Return ‘Part B’, completed by all charities with an annual income of greater than 
£500,000. Information on individual charity’s registration with the Fundraising Regulator 
was extracted from the Public Register (Fundraising Regulator 2017) as at 1 August 2017 by 
scraping the register website using Python and the Beautiful Soup module. This created a 
dataset of charity numbers and the status of their membership of the Fundraising Regulator. 
These two datasets were linked deterministically using registered charity numbers, contained 
within both the Charity Commission’s Charity Register and the Fundraising Regulator’s 
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Public Register. Our sample does not include ‘exempt’ or ‘excepted’ charities that are not 
regulated by the Charity Commission, as for those financial data is not available. 
Our analysis focuses on the registration of charities within the first year of the Fundraising 
Regulator’s operation, and prior to their ‘naming and shaming’ of non-payers. In the linked 
analysis dataset we have a working sample of 4,147 charities with an annual income of over 
£500,000, of whom 1,865 spent over £100,000 on generating voluntary income in 2014 and 
therefore are expected to pay the levy. The analysis dataset and Stata syntax files are 
available at GitHub.1 
As stated, a critical assumption of this method is that charities not be able to manipulate their 
eligibility. This is satisfied as the relevant financial years (2014) would have finished prior to 
the review (2015) with accounts submitted by all charities well in advance of the final levy 
details being announced (2016). This is confirmed by the results of two formal tests of 
whether there is a discontinuity in the density of organizations at the £100k threshold: 
dcdensity (McCrary 2008); and rddensity (Cattaneo et al. 2018). The results of both tests (i.e. 
miniscule, statistically insignificant discontinuity estimates) suggest that there is no clustering 
around the threshold and thus no precise manipulation of fundraising expenditure in response 
to the setting of the threshold – see the supplementary document accompanying this paper for 
details of these tests. While there may be scope for marginal charities to influence their 
eligibility in future years this was not the case in the current eligibility period. 
Secondly, it is important that other covariates that might influence the outcome are 
continuous across the threshold. We estimated regression discontinuities for four covariates: 
total income, total expenditure, number of employees, and number of volunteers. These 
baseline covariates are smooth around the £100k threshold – see the supplementary document 
for details of these models. While there are other unrelated charity reporting thresholds (e.g. 
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supplying enhanced financial reporting for charities whose income exceeds £500k) these are 
not directly related to expenditure on fundraising. The Fundraising Regulator’s charge does 
vary slightly across the threshold: charities below may join for £50 while the lowest annual 
levy rate is £150. However, this difference of £100 would represent 0.1% of a marginal 
charities fundraising expenditure, and a likely 0.001% of their annual income, and so is 






Figure 2 shows the population of charities with total income greater than £0.5 million in 
2014. In panel (a) the charities colored red are above the levy threshold (n=1,865; 45%), 
while those colored blue are below the threshold (n=2,282; 55%). The second panel colors 
only those charities who elected to pay the levy; above the threshold are Levy Payers eligible 
to be ‘named and shamed’, and below the threshold are voluntary payers. As expected, the 
participation rate above the threshold is 67.3%, much higher than that below the threshold at 
9.3%, but we still observe significant numbers of non-payers above and voluntary payers 
below the threshold. The Fundraising Regulator reported an annual income from regulatory 
activities of £1.5m in the financial year ending 31st March 2017 (Fundraising Regulator 
2018), although this covers a different twelve-month period from the regulatory year which 




[Figure 2 here] 
 
Estimating the Effect of the Levy on Participation 
We estimate the RDD models across both the whole sample, and also on a sample restricted 





Table 1 shows the discontinuity estimates from the RDD models estimated across the two 
samples with polynomials of order one (alternative functional forms and bandwidth 
specifications can be found in the supplementary document). Both models show a large and 
statistically significant discontinuity around the levy threshold. The RDD method provides 
the best causal estimates close to the threshold, and so the sub-sample model estimated on 
charities spending between £1 and £200,000 is the preferred model with an effect of the levy 
threshold on participation estimated at 0.399 (95% CI 0.253 - 0.545). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The scale of the discontinuity can be observed graphically in   
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Figure 3, which shows the plots of the two regression discontinuity models.   
 
 24 
Figure 3a shows the discontinuity estimated across the whole sample, while   
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Figure 3b shows the estimation +/- £100k around the levy threshold. Both demonstrate the 
large and significant discontinuity in participation. Using the local estimation model, the 
estimates suggest that a charity spending £99,999 on fundraising would have an 18.3% 
chance of joining the fundraising regulator, whilst a charity spending £100,001 on 
fundraising would have a 58.2% chance of joining. Therefore the estimated treatment effect 
of the fundraising levy is to increase participation by 39.9 percentage points. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Estimating the Effect of Price on Participation 
The regression discontinuity can be extended to examine participation discontinuity around 
the increasing levy payment bands for charities spending greater than £100k on fundraising. 
The sample size allows us to estimate these models for the first six payment bands above the 
threshold; the small number of very large charities prohibits estimation of discontinuities for 
charities spending more than £10 million on fundraising. This involves applying the same 
RDD method to test for discontinuities in charities’ participation as prices change. Essentially 
the argument is the same: a charity who spent £499,999 on their fundraising activity would be 
charged £800 to join, whilst a charity who spent £500,001 on fundraising would be charged 
nearly twice as much, at £1,500. If charities are price sensitive in joining the regulatory 
scheme then we would expect the probability of joining to fall as the threshold is crossed. If 




Figure 4 shows the RDD plots for the first six payment bands above the levy threshold. We 
focus on the jump between the lines, with a fall in participation across the threshold being 
consistent with charities being price-sensitive in their joining of the regulator. As the plots 
suggest, none of these discontinuities are large or statistically significant. Only the £200k 
threshold actually shows a discontinuity in the expected direction, decreasing participation 
after the threshold, the remaining five actually suggest a small increase in participation across 
the threshold. This supports regulatory participation increasing in fundraising expenditure 
despite the increasing levy payment. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Levy Income Projections 
An important question for the Fundraising Regulator is the impact that this policy had on its 
income, and therefore budget available to undertake regulatory activity. We can use the 
estimates of levy participation to forecast the likely total levy income of the Fundraising 
Regulator. We do this under three different assumptions about participation rates if 
participation had been completely voluntary, without the regulator’s policy of ‘naming and 
shaming’ charities who did not pay to join, in order to get a description of the distribution of 
possible outcomes. These scenarios are 1) a conservative assumption that propensity to 
participate is constant across fundraising income; 2) that propensity to participate follows a 




Total income under each scenario is calculated by multiplying the probability of participation 
by the appropriate levy fee for each charity, and summing all these amounts (where pi is the 
estimated probability of participation for charity i and Li is the membership fee due given the 
fundraising expenditure of charity i): 
      (4) 
The baseline estimate of scenario 1 assumes a flat participation rate across charities (i.e. 
participation does not increase with fundraising expenditure), estimated from charities just 
below the levy threshold. This produces a lower estimate of £400,000. Two alternative 
models (linear probability and logistic regression) are used to estimate  by fitting the 
patterns of participation above the threshold. When this participation probability is adjusted 
by subtracting the estimated treatment effect of the levy, both these scenarios forecast a total 
income for the Fundraising Regulator of just under £800,000. This is about half the income 




Figure 5 shows the estimated participation rates without the levy for the three scenarios. This 
can be compared to the average participation rate observed with the levy, represented by the 
grey line. Table 2 reports the estimated income for the Fundraising Regulator in the first year 
given the three scenarios considered. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
These estimates suggest that the fundraising levy generated around £900,000 more income 
than would have been received in a purely voluntary scheme. Under the previous system of 
self-regulation, the Fundraising Standards Board (FRSB) generated a total income from 
membership fees of £506,000 (Civil Society, 2015), which suggests that scenarios 2 and 3 are 
reasonable estimates of total value of participation in the absence of the levy structure. 
Discussion 
Our results suggest that fundraising charities’ concern for reputational damage of non-
participation in fundraising regulation far outweighs the cost to the organizations. We 
estimate a significant causal effect of the levy for charities around the threshold. For charities 
above the threshold we find no evidence of discontinuities around the payment steps that 
would suggest the cost of the levy is a binding constraint. Instead, participation seems to be 
increasing in line with fundraising expenditure, showing both the falling relative cost and the 
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likely greater benefits of participation for charities which engage in greater levels of 
fundraising activity. 
This has a number of clear implications. Firstly, fundraising charities place a high value on 
their reputations, and the threat of being ‘named and shamed’ by the Regulator was a 
significant one. This outcome is consistent with the theoretical perspective offered by the 
broader regulatory compliance literature: compliance with requirements “increases with 
increased perceptions of potential punishment” (Yee et al. 2016, 108; see also Lee 2010). 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of ‘brand’ to charities (Michel and 
Rueuiner 2012; Sargeant et al. 2008), while others have identified that potential donors base 
their perceptions where possible on personal experiences of a charity (Furneaux and Wymer 
2015) and otherwise on proxies such as the status of an organization (Sargeant et al. 2008). 
That such a high proportion of fundraising charities pressurized to pay the levy have done so 
suggests that they are aware of the damage that being named and shamed for not paying 
could do to their reputation and ‘brand’.  
Secondly, the levy was necessary to secure the level of participation of charities observed, 
particularly for small to medium-sized fundraising charities. In the first year that the regulator 
required charities with a qualifying fundraising spend to pay the levy, a total of 1,408 paid 
up. This is more than the 1,258 organizations who were paid up members of the Fundraising 
Standards Board shortly before it was closed, a number which it had taken five years to build 
towards (Breen 2012). However, while the fear of the impact of being named and shamed 
clearly concerned charities enough to make large numbers sign up, and research suggests that 
regulation can help to ensure that charities behave transparently and accountably (Cordery 
and Morgan 2013; Phillips 2013; Thompson and Williams 2014), if charities feel that the 
costs of regulation identified by Bekkers (2003) and Corry (2010) outweigh the benefits they 
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receive then they may cease to pay. While naming and shaming appears to have persuaded 
organizations to pay the levy initially, and therefore appears to have been necessary, if 
organizations fail to see benefit from the regulation they might well decide to take the risk of 
not paying. It remains to be seen whether the initial ‘success’ of a threat to ‘name and shame’ 
transpires into a long term commitment from organizations to pay the levy. 
Thirdly, the levy fee itself is not a significant barrier to participation for most charities. While 
the Fundraising Regulator needs to take a wide range of factors into account when setting the 
fee bands and levels, our analysis suggests that a small increase in the fee levels would not 
lead to significantly lower regulatory participation even amongst small to medium-sized 
charities. The corollary of this is that reducing the fees is unlikely to significantly increase 
participation by charities. It does not appear that cost is a significant motivator in 
participation, and there is very little evidence of price sensitivity in determining whether 
organizations pay or not. However, having set the levy bands as they are, a raise in the cost 
without proving to organizations that paying the levy is good for their charity – rather than 
that not paying is bad – may cause organizations to reevaluate whether to pay or not. As 
Bekkers (2003) notes, regulation can be an expensive way of increasing public trust in 
charities.  
Fourthly, the estimated marginal income due to the levy scheme is very significant, and 
without this it is likely that the level of resources available for fundraising regulation would 
be significantly lower. It could therefore be argued that the ‘name and shame’ approach was 
necessary to ensure initial engagement in a new regulator who initially at least could provide 
no evidence of prior effective regulation. In need of initial funding to establish a reputation as 
an effective regulator, the Fundraising Regulator took an approach that ensured a significant 
proportion of eligible organizations paid the levy early in the process. Going forward, it is 
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likely that it will need to prove to be an effective regulator, delivering the benefits identified 
by Cordery and Morgan (2013), Philips (2013) and Thompson and Williams (2014). Should 
the Regulator fail to do so, it is likely organizations will opt out in future years. The 
transactional relationship that the threat of shaming creates is likely to result in organizations 
being particularly demanding that the regulator delivers the promised benefits. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that the ‘name and shame’ approach can be an effective strategy for 
regulators where the regulated organizations are concerned for their reputations. In the short 
term, it has the potential to drive participation in regulation even where there is little statutory 
powers to compel it. The successful implementation of this approach by the Fundraising 
Regulator may act as a proof-of-concept for other independent charity regulators, such as 
those in Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and England & 
Wales. For instance, the Charity Commission for England & Wales has for some time now 
considered charging charities a regulatory fee, though a long-awaited consultation on this 
policy has failed to materialize (Civil Society 2018). However, regulators need to be aware 
that this approach may come at the cost of building confidence in the new regime. It remains 
to be seen whether this approach is effective in the medium to long term, and how the 
participation of charities evolves over time. To ensure continued support, the Regulator will 
need to demonstrate to charities that they should pay the levy because of the positive 
outcomes of regulation (as identified by Breen 2009; Connolly and Hyndman 2013; Cordery 
and Morgan 2013; Cordery et al. 2017; Keating and Frumkin 2003; Morgan 2012) rather than 
because of the continued threat of naming and shaming. 
For this to occur, charities need to be seen to publicly support the Regulator and to be paying 
the levy not because of the threat to reputation of not paying but rather for the reputational 
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boost that being regulated will bring to individual organizations and to the sector as a whole. 
Fundraising charities are dependent on trust if donors are to give (Bekkers 2003) and visible 
and effective regulation can build trust. Furthermore, charities willingly contributing to the 
cost of regulation can result in them being perceived by donors as buying into the regulation 
both literally and symbolically (Hogg 2018). A sector which is seen to be committed to the 
maintenance of ethical good practice is likely to benefit from greater public trust than one 
which is seen to be scared of the damage that not paying might cause. It is unlikely that a 
voluntary levy which charities need to be named and shamed into paying will lead to 
significant changes in practices by charities. Rather, what will lead to meaningful change is a 
well-funded regulator which supports and supervises fundraising and is seen by both charities 
and the public to be doing so effectively. 
Further research will be needed in future years to explore whether charities continue to pay 
the levy and whether a wider range of organizations, including those below the levy 
threshold, pay the levy because of the benefits of paying rather than because of the threat of 
non-paying. While our data does not allow us to make forecasts about the future, we feel that 
the ‘name and shame’ tactic could be problematic going forward should charities not see the 
benefits of the regulation. Further, the Charity Commission for England & Wales may over 
the next few years introduce charges of its own for charity regulation (see Hogg 2018) which 
may impact on charities’ willingness to pay the Fundraising Regulator levy. 
Therefore, we argue that while the Fundraising Regulator has been successful in its efforts to 
stimulate participation in the levy scheme, it should be cognizant of the limitations of 
adopting a regulatory approach that is coercive, and focused on monitoring and sanctioning 
noncompliance with demands or requirements (Carter 2016). External, coercive pressure to 
be accountable has “limited potential for encouraging organizations and individuals to take 
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internal responsibility for shaping their organizational mission, values, and performance or 
for promoting ethical behavior.” [emphasis added] (Ebrahim 2010, 13). It remains to be seen 
whether paying the levy represents a strategic response by charities, thus leading to the 
raising of fundraising standards, or if it is simply weak, pro-forma compliance with the 
demands of the regulator.  
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Tables and Figures 








£100k to £149k £150 
£150k to £199k £300 
£200k to £499k £800 
£500k to £999k £1,500 
£1m to £1.99m £2,500 
£2m to £4.99m £4,000 
£5m to £9.99m £6,000 
£10m to £19.99m £8,000 
£20m to £49.99m £12,000 
Over £50m £15,000 
Source: Fundraising Regulator and Charity Commission 
Note: The percentage of fundraising spend is calculated by dividing the levy payment by the annual expenditure 







Figure 2: Levy Eligibility and Payment Status 
 (a)      (b) 
 
Notes: Sample of 4,147 charities with an annual income greater than £0.5m in 2014.  Of these, 1,865 (45%) are 
above the threshold, and 2,282 (55%) are below the threshold, shown in panel (a). Of those above the threshold, 
1,255 (67.3%) paid the levy. Of those below the threshold, only 212 (9.3%) paid the membership fee. Total 





Table 1: RDD Estimates of the effect of Levy threshold on the probability of participation in 
funding the regulator 
   RD Model 
Sample Coef. Std Error 95% Conf. Interval Observations 





.088*** .194 - .540 4,147 
Sub-sample 
(£1-£200,000) 
.399 .074*** .253 - .545 2,896 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Figures rounded to three decimal places. RDD models estimated as 
polynomials of order one. Further robustness checks of the polynomial and bandwidth selections are available in 
Appendix One. 




Figure 3: Regression Discontinuity Design Models 








Figure 4: Estimating Discontinuities in Levy Pay Bands 
 
Note: Only the first six (of nine) higher payment thresholds are shown, as the sample sizes for the three highest 





Table 2: Forecasted Fundraising Regulator Income 
Scenario Projected 
Income 
Status Quo £1,690,450 
1) Discontinuity threshold estimate of 18.3% applied across levy 
charities 
£416,201 
2) Linear probability model of participation minus RDD levy 
treatment effect 
£771,823 
3) Logistic model of participation minus RDD levy treatment effect £782,852 
Note: The Status Quo is calculated by summing the levy payments for each recorded paying charity above the 
threshold. Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 are the sum of the levy fees for each charity in the sample, weighted by: (1) the 
RDD estimated participation rate immediately below the discontinuity (18.3%);  (2) the forecasted participation 
rate from third-order polynomial a linear probability model of fundraising expenditure minus the RDD treatment 
effect; and (3) the forecasted participation rate from third-order polynomial logistic model of fundraising 





Figure 5: Forecasted Regulation Participation and Estimated Income Without Levy 
 
Note: “Spend on generating voluntary income” is shown on a logarithmic scale 
